Showing posts sorted by date for query Suhr. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Suhr. Sort by relevance Show all posts

January 8, 2012

The Journal-Sentinel's Rick Esenberg Disclaimer

I see David Haynes and the mandarins on the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel editorial board have added a disclaimer to Marquette University Law School professor Rick Esenberg's attempt at defending Mike Gableman's reported acceptance of a gift or favor from Michael Best & Friedrich, to the effect that Esenberg recently presented oral argument before the court on which Gableman sits. Judges are prohibited by the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct from accepting gifts or favors from lawyers or firms if they have or are likely to come before the judge.

That's a relatively innocuous disclaimer compared to Esenberg's prior relationships with the Gableman political campaign. Esenberg appeared in a video produced by Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce which was distributed at a series of WMC luncheons in 2008. Rick Esenberg's former research assistant at Marquette, Daniel Suhr, assembled a "white paper" criticizing the record of former Justice Louis Butler — perhaps the only actor deserving of the appellation "honorable" in this whole sordid affair — the misrepresentations of law contained in which Esenberg strenuously defended at his blog, where Esenberg also repeated and purported to rationalize some of the sleaziest accusations against Justice Butler.

And Rick Esenberg's Bradley Foundation-funded Kulturkampf boutique law firm, the Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty, hired Tom Kamenick, a former clerk of Gableman's, as an associate. It's like incest but without the sex. Given the foregoing, the Journal-Sentinel's disclaimer is a bit of a joke. The fact that Esenberg argued a case before the Supreme Court isn't such a big deal, unless you realize what case it was, which the Journal-Sentinel's disclaimer doesn't identify.

The case is Wisconsin Prosperity Network v. Myse and Esenberg presented the argument instead of James "Carried ... feet first" Troupis, who represented Justice David Prosser during the latter's political campaign last spring. It's also the case from which Prosser disqualified himself in September, 2011 apparently after being pressured by the Journal-Sentinel's reporting, even though this blog had pointed to the potential conflict of interest as early as the previous April.

Speaking of which case, Prosser and Gableman literally rewrote the Wisconsin constitution to grant an injunction in 2010 in favor of the plaintiffs, a who's who of conservative Republican activists, the granting of which was executed even before the court had decided whether to take jurisdiction of the case. A decision is forthcoming in Myse but a date hasn't been announced. This blog wondered several weeks ago how a divided court is going to address the posture of that injunction.

The Journal-Sentinel is a wholly owned subsidiary of Journal Communications, Inc., which itself is in effect a wholly owned subsidiary of the WISGOP. The transparency of these relationships is remarkable.

But yeah, thanks for the illuminating disclaimer. Great public service.

June 29, 2011

Daniel is Suhr tenacious, I'll give him that much

[Good grief man.]

Mr. Suhr, thank you for taking the time. I must say I have always found kibbutzing with you on the internets a source of considerable amusement and I am sincerely grateful for that as well.

However, please have a look one more time at § 809.71, which refers back to and incorporates by that reference § 809.51. A person seeking a supervisory writ under § 809.71 (e.g., petitioner Mike Huebsch [a.k.a. Scott Walker] who, incidentally, ended up getting something he never sought by dint of the punctuational jurisdiction invented by Justice/Gableman) must file "in accordance with s. 809.51." Thus does "the court" in § 809.51 mean the Supreme Court, in perfect consonance with the wise and premonitory guidance set forth in § 809.01(4).

So to continue to insist, as you are doing above, that "the court" in § 809.51 can mean "only" the Court of Appeals is, as the saying goes, absurd. Again: I am not misapplying § 809.51 but rather reading it in its alternate context, following the direction of § 809.71.

The only thing in § 809.51 that § 809.71 does not incorporate by reference is, obviously, the former's language, "or its original jurisdiction," which is where your superfluity analysis would apply, as the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is addressed separately, in § 809.70.

And these have been my contentions from the outset: that original and supervisory jurisdiction are separate and distinct forms of judicial authority, and that there is no constitutional basis for Justice/Gableman's creation of an alternatively convenient source of judicial power by forward slash.

(Setting amusement aside for a moment, your main post here at the Marquette University Law School faculty blog embodies an unwarranted criticism of my writing and I can only hope that your readers continue on throughout this comments thread for the fuller explication. However, experience teaches me that that is not something upon which I can depend, if you're picking up what I'm throwing down.)

By the way, a not dissimilar question of construction arose at the time the Walker administration attempted vainly to claim publication of 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 while publication was temporarily enjoined. A provision might have two different meanings, or two different applications, depending upon how it may be incorporated by reference into other statutory provisions.

You can read all about that little brouhaha at my own wildly popular blog, illusory tenant, in a post entitled, "Wisconsin statutes, a couple three of them," of March 26, 2011. Or, if you prefer, Prof. Fallone's compelling epistle of March 28, at this present location, [*] which covers much of the same ground (as Prof. Fallone was most generous to acknowledge).

Have a good one, Mr. Suhr, and keep those FedSoc recruits coming.

* That is, the Marquette University Law School faculty blog, to whence the above comment was submitted. Should be posted in a day or two.

June 27, 2011

Marquette law school's honorary faculty, Daniel Suhr

I see our friend Daniel Suhr is up to his risible tricks* at the Marquette University Law School faculty blog, accusing me of "fail[ing] to note" that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is a court of appeals, or something.

In a nutshell, and in reference to this post, Mr. Suhr claims Wis. Stat. § 809.51 applies only to these courts of appeal and thus does not direct attentive readers of the law to §§ 809.70 and 809.71, which distinguish between the two types of jurisdictional authority, supervisory and original (the two that Gableman & Co. conjoined with a forward slash).

The hapless Mr. Suhr is either unaware that the Supreme Court is itself a court of appeals or else failed to read the set of definitions provided at the outset to Chapter 809 of the Wisconsin Statutes and Annotations:
"Court" means the court of appeals or, if the appeal or other proceeding is in the supreme court, the supreme court.
It's a mystery why the faculty continues to publish Mr. Suhr's claptrap.

Frankly, it's embarrassing to other, competent MULS alumni.

At least he might read the law prior to leveling his absurd accusations. I most certainly do, and furthermore see no need to reiterate each and every jot and tittle of it in a blog post, particularly those provisions that are so blindingly obvious to everyone save the "research assistant" Suhr.

Lord, make me a vessel of Your patience.

* See also Ed Fallone's comment. My own is "awaiting moderation."

Here it is, just in case:

Thanks Prof. Fallone.

Evidently Mr. Suhr himself "failed to note" § 809.01(4): "[In this chapter] 'Court' means the court of appeals, or if the appeal or other proceeding is in the supreme court, the supreme court." So clearly § 809.51 does indeed "carry forward" to §§ 809.70 and 809.71, contrary to Mr. Suhr’s unique rationalizations. Now perhaps Mr. Suhr would be so kind as to withdraw his accusation that I misapplied § 809.51.

March 24, 2010

FedSoc research assistant keeps up the good work

"You heard it here first: Oral argument April 16."
Welcome to six weeks ago.

Where was Master Suhr when William Bablitch was Randy Koschnick's primary cudgel with which to beat Shirley Abrahamson, one wonders.

Based on, of all things, a story in the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel.

August 20, 2009

Papal encyclical may be "naïve or dumb"

Says this guy, bemoaning all that Catholic "peace and justice" crap.

h/t Former Marquette law school "alum blogger of the month" Daniel Suhr, who is concerned that some actual teachings of Jesus Christ might have inadvertently contaminated Herr Ratzinger's otherwise infallible commitment to free market capitalism and union busting.

February 2, 2009

Koschnick "unaware" of the law

Last week we learned that the political campaign of Jefferson County Circuit Court Judge Randy Koschnick is playing a little fast and loose with the facts of State v. Knapp, the infamous "bloody shoes case" Koschnick is using to attack Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson.

Now we discover that Judge Koschnick and his supporters are engaging in a similar enterprise with the law, and attempting to solicit money from its propagation.

A fundraising letter authorized and paid for by Judge Koschnick's campaign and attached with a return-addressed envelope to stuff with cash contributions makes the following claims:
Invoking principles of "new federalism" Abrahamson voted with the majority to require suppression of physical evidence obtained as the result of un-Mirandized statements. Wisconsin is the only state who [sic] affords this protection to criminal defendants.
The latter assertion is presumably made in furtherance of Judge Koschnick's repeated insistence that Chief Justice Abrahamson is not only an "activist" who "legislates from the bench," but is also one who does so in an especially radical and solitary manner.

Only one small problem: The claim is demonstrably false and the four cases following below clearly demonstrate its falsity. One of the four is actually discussed at length in Justice Patrick Crooks's concurring opinion in Knapp, the very decision that Koschnick is criticizing.

The other three were issued by State appeals courts after State v. Knapp appeared in 2005. The most recent is already nine months old.

At last Thursday's candidates forum, the Chief Justice, after reminding him that the fundraising letter uses the present tense, gave Judge Koschnick several opportunities to retract the claim.

"Still think that's a correct statement?" she inquired. "I do," Judge Koschnick replied, "I don't think that those decisions allow for suppression of physical evidence following a Miranda violation."

Well, they do.

While some might believe this to be an insignificant matter, were a lawyer on the record in court to insist for the purposes of her legal argument that Wisconsin is the only State "who" adheres to a particular position on a particular question of law, she could very well be facing professional sanctions.

As an aside, it's interesting to note that an aspiring Republican operative by the name of Daniel Suhr also put forward false claims concerning two of the four cases, Farris and Peterson, which were previously addressed at this blog here and here last winter.

Mr. Suhr was attempting to show the invidious interstate influence of former Justice Louis B. Butler by asserting that the highest courts of Ohio* and Vermont derived inspiration from and followed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reasoning in State v. Knapp.

This is also demonstrably false, as both courts clearly arrived at their conclusions independently and based those conclusions ultimately on their own State precedent, their own interpretation of federal decisions, and their own State constitutions (that final deference being indicative of the "new federalism" of which Koschnick speaks).

But while Suhr was also completely wrong, his false assertions are independent of Koschnick's more recent ones, as Koschnick is now claiming that Wisconsin is the only (italics Koschnick's) State that suppresses physical evidence where the suspect is not afforded a constitutionally adequate Miranda warning, whether that State actually relied on Knapp or not (which, by the way, none of them did).

Daniel Suhr was graciously forgiven for his partisan zeal and gross errors, as he was at the time yet to take his own attorney's oath before a justice of the Supreme Court (I hope it was Louis Butler).

But at least Suhr was "aware" of the law, much like an aspirant to the Wisconsin Supreme Court should be, especially when it's related to a question that appears to be the centerpiece of his political campaign.

The current incumbent certainly appears to be aware of it.

Unfortunately, Judge Koschnick's errors can be less easily dismissed — for a number of very obvious reasons. Here are the cases, along with some relevant excerpts:

Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198 (Mass. 2005)
The question presented in this case is whether the failure to give Miranda warnings to a suspect in custody requires suppression of physical evidence derived from an unwarned statement he made in response to police interrogation. Prior to the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), the answer (at least in Massachusetts) would clearly have been "yes." We have consistently held that statements obtained in violation of the principles laid down in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are not admissible in evidence themselves, and may not properly be used to secure additional evidence for use at trial.

Because we conclude that the Supreme Court's construction of the Miranda rule, which was intended to secure the privilege against compelled incrimination in the context of inherently coercive custodial interrogations, is no longer adequate to safeguard the parallel but broader protections afforded Massachusetts citizens by art. 12, we adopt a common-law rule governing the admissibility of physical evidence obtained in these circumstances. Such evidence, if derived from unwarned statements where Miranda warnings would have been required by Federal law in order for them to be admissible, is presumptively excludable from evidence at trial as "fruit" of the improper failure to provide such warnings.
State v. Farris, 849 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 2006)
To hold that the physical evidence seized as a result of unwarned statements is inadmissible, we would have to hold that Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection to criminal defendants than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We so find here.

We believe that the overall administration of justice in Ohio requires a law-enforcement environment in which evidence is gathered in conjunction with Miranda, not in defiance of it. We thus join the other states that have already determined after Patane that their state constitutions’ protections against self-incrimination extend to physical evidence seized as a result of pre-Miranda statements.

Thus, the physical evidence obtained as a result of the unwarned statements made by Farris in this case is inadmissible pursuant to Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
State v. Peterson, 923 A.2d 585 (Vt. 2007)
We agree with the analysis and result reached in each of these cases [Farris and Knapp].

For the above reasons, we conclude that we will not follow United States v. Patane under Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution and our exclusionary rule. Physical evidence gained from statements obtained under circumstances that violate Miranda is inadmissible in criminal proceedings as fruit of the poisonous tree. Since it is undisputed that the marijuana plants were such fruit in this case, the district court erred in failing to suppress them.
State v. Vondehn, No. C040956CR (Or. Ct. App. filed April 30, 2008)
For the foregoing reasons, Patane does not undermine our conclusion that police exploitation of conduct that violates rights that Article I, section 12, protects will taint any evidence that the police obtain in the same way that conduct that violates Article I, section 9, does. (fn 15) Accordingly, we conclude that the Hall analysis applies to evidence that the police obtain as the result of exploiting a Miranda violation and that that evidence is inadmissible at trial.

The question in this case, thus, is whether the police obtained defendant's post-Miranda statements by exploiting both his pre-Miranda statements and the evidence that they obtained from the search of the backpack, evidence that was itself the fruit of the previous exploitation of the original illegality. We conclude that they did.

(fn 15) In so concluding, we join the other states that have already determined after Patane that their state constitutions' protections against self-incrimination extend to physical evidence seized as a result of pre-Miranda statements. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 923 A.2d 585 (Vt. 2007); State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St. 3d 519, 849 N.E.2d 985 (2006), cert. den., Ohio v. Farris, ___ US ___, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007); State v. Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (2005); Commonwealth v. Martin, 444 Mass. 213, 827 N.E.2d 198 (2005).
Wisconsin is the only State? Not exactly.

I can't speak for anybody else, but I would surely expect a qualified candidate for the Wisconsin Supreme Court to apprise himself of the current state of the law before he attempted to deploy it against his opponent for purely political (and fundraising) purposes.

* As an attorney acquaintance of mine who spent many years practicing in the Buckeye State colorfully observed back then:

"The interesting fact to me is that everyone in the majority on the Ohio decision [State v. Farris] — Justices Pfeifer, O'Connor and Lanzinger, along with Chief Justice Moyer — is a lifelong, old-school, law-and-order Republican.

"The notion that some wild-eyed liberal from another state could lead those four people down the garden path toward a real world Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas is preposterous beyond description."

December 3, 2008

Marquette alum reappears for more comic relief

For some strange reason our old friend Daniel Suhr is posting at the Marquette Law School faculty blog. Today's entry finds him pontificating further to a couple of issues roughly related to the Mike Gableman case currently before the Wisconsin Judicial Commission.

Mr. Suhr, it may be fondly recalled, was a fervent and devoted disciple of Mike Gableman practically to the point of hysterics, recklessly mangling the case law and pronouncing former State Supreme Court Justice Louis Butler a menace to the Homeland.

Now it seems one of Gableman's several attorneys, James Bopp, obtained a victory of sorts after challenging in federal court a provision of the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct which forbade a candidate for judge directly soliciting campaign contributions.

The Wisconsin corollary is Supreme Court Rule 60.06(4). As was mentioned here a few days ago, a Milwaukee County circuit court judge, the Hon. John Siefert, is in the process of challenging that same provision pursuant to a complaint filed last February.

Prophesies Suhr, "Under the federal district court’s decision in Kansas, it seems clear that 60.06(4) is unconstitutional." Not only that but the recent Kansas disposition, Suhr ventures, "may result in new litigation in Wisconsin."

Clearly intrigued by this point, Mr. Suhr at last wonders: "Will a Wisconsin judge or candidate soon challenge [60.06(4)] as such?"

Well, yes, a Wisconsin judge will indeed challenge SCR 60.06(4) "as such," at least just as soon as last February rolls around. In fact Daniel Suhr himself provides a link to a reply memorandum filed in Siefert v. Alexander, which he apparently neglected to read.

The oversight is understandable, I suppose, when one is beside oneself with evident glee at the prospect of an heroic Mike Gableman invalidating a rule of judicial ethics designed to discourage and perhaps prevent lying about a perceived political rival, the very rule that none other than Mike Gableman stands accused of violating.

As for the actual law school faculty bloggers, I heartily recommend Prof. Michael O'Hear's* highly informative weekly coverage of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

* Distinguished owner of the world's largest coffee cup.

May 29, 2008

Poor Mike Gableman

It's been some time since we've encountered Daniel Suhr, the fresh young GOP fellow in the robin's egg sweater vest combo.

Now it seems that Master Suhr has taken special umbrage at Adam Liptak's description of renowned conservative Republican Mike Gableman as "a small-town judge with thin credentials" in the pages of the New York Times. "This East Coast elitism is just rancid," moans the young GOPer.

First of all, Siren, WI is a small town by any measure.

But it's simply not true, Suhr 'argues,' because Mike Gableman's "four years as a front-line prosecutor is more than [Wisconsin Supreme Court] Justices Abrahamson, Bradley, and Butler have combined." Naturally, young Daniel doesn't mention that Justice Butler has been a judge — on three different courts — for longer than Mike Gableman has been a lawyer.

And a highly effective front-line prosecutor Mike Gableman was. So effective that he sat on a homicide case for two years, one so cold blooded that the criminal complaint indicated the alleged perpetrator blew a hole in his wife's back with a shotgun as she fled away from him, and the county where Mike Gableman toiled as a prosecutor refused to elect him to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, despite every surrounding county's determination to the contrary.

Likely because Ashland County is where they know "front-line prosecutor" Mike Gableman the best. And by the time charges were filed by Gableman's successor in office, after Gableman high-tailed it to an administrative position at a 20k per annum pay cut thanks to his political connections with former Republican governor Scott McCallum, the defendant removed himself from the gene pool.

And Mike Gableman had the temerity to claim repeatedly, during one of the most disgraceful political campaigns in recent memory, that he was a righteous advocate for victims of crime.

"I was mad as hell," the victim's cousin, Jerry Bauch said. "I was frustrated because the case simply went nowhere during the three years that [Mike Gableman] was district attorney."

That's some quality victim advocatin' right there.

However, it is true that Gableman won Burnett County fairly handily, because after all, that is where Judge Mike Gableman "presided over" 9,000 uncontested traffic tickets.

And that is no thin credential. It's enough to wallpaper Siren, WI.

"There's no need to insult the man," sniffs college Republican Suhr, who, via some particularly laughable contortions, depicted Justice Butler as a clear and present danger to the "safety, prosperity, and health of the citizens of many states, especially Wisconsin."

No, there's no need to insult the man, he just earned the privilege.

February 21, 2008

Charlie's Club For Mirth

Another brouhaha has broken out in the election campaign pitting incumbent Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Louis Butler against challenger Burnett County Judge Michael Gableman. Some Republicans calling themselves the Club For Growth got their hands on a series of e-mails among some members of the WJCIC, a watchdog committee set up by the president of the State Bar of Wisconsin to monitor campaign materials and statements.

One supposedly "influential" local blogger describes the e-mails as "breathtaking" and claims the WJCIC has been "Caught In Blatant Lying." He also obsequiously credits right-wing Milwaukee radio and teevee shouting head Charlie Sykes with "tak[ing] the trouble to excerpt some of the more troubling bits" (in fact all Sykes did was copy and paste material from the Republican outfit's webpage. Sykes can't even be troubled to spell Justice Butler's name correctly).

Some of the more entertaining portions of the e-mails concern Sykes himself. The committee briefly discusses, for example, an earlier Sykes cut-and-paste job from the Club For Growth's website alleging the committee's supposed "direct ties" to Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle and wonders whether it should formulate a response. Committee member Bill Kraus observes, "Replying to Charlie is the equivalent of getting into a pissing contest with a skunk."

Interestingly, in the same Sykes blog entry of January 3, which described the WJCIC as "a scam," longtime Republican Kraus is portrayed as the only committee member without a tie to Doyle.

In another instance of Sykes and his fellow GOP hatchet-persons wanting it both ways, the Club For Growth's initial complaints centered on the WJCIC's lack of ideological, gender, and "minority" diversity. Since then, committee chairman Tom Basting has apparently sought (and implemented) ways to increase both the size of the committee and its diversity, citing recommendations made by similar judicial watchdog groups in other States.

But since many of the e-mail messages also express concerns about the committee's perception among the public, Club For Growth cherry picks through these to portray Basting as a liar — a liar for making moves to rectify complaints the Club For Growth made in the first place. Or, as the blogger in the funny pants puts it, "Blatant lying."

Last I checked, that's a pretty serious charge.

For a crowd that has devoted so much time and energy to dissecting the WJCIC and pooh-poohing its power, mandate, influence, legitimacy, etc., they sure do seem to take it pretty seriously nonetheless, don't they.

If the WJCIC ever desired a higher media profile — and there is considerable evidence in the e-mails that it does — this gang of Republican hucksters is sure handing it over on a silver platter.

Meanwhile, Basting and Gableman lieutenant Darrin Schmitz continue their war of words, in a pair of letters available via WisPolitics.com, here (.pdf) and here. And the ever dependable young GOP operative Daniel Suhr proves once again that he's incapable of reading a Louis Butler opinion by wondering why the Butler campaign describes its principal as a scholar, preferring instead a definition that includes 'student editor of the law review and writer of magazine articles.'

Doubtless there will be much more to come in the days hence. Grumps of the Happy Circumstance fortuitously provides the appropriate words of wisdom, from the desk of H.L. Mencken:
Has the art of politics no apparent utility? Does it appear to be unqualifiedly ratty, raffish, sordid, obscene, and low down, and its salient virtuosi a gang of unmitigated scoundrels? Then let us not forget its high capacity to soothe and tickle the midriff, its incomparable services as a maker of entertainment.
Finally, One Wisconsin Now reveals its own rummaging into the circumstances of Michael Gableman's current employment:

Gableman's Suspicious Appointment

February 14, 2008

Atty. Tom Basting appointed to State bench

Remember Daniel Suhr? He's the Marquette law student and protégé of conservative blogger Rick Esenberg who claims the pernicious influence of Justice Louis Butler extends to other courts outside this State, even when those courts reach their own independent decisions by relying on everything else EXCEPT Wisconsin law.

Now Suhr, who apparently advocates for "strict constructionism" (or "strict constitutionalism," as the kids are calling it nowadays) evidently believes that a set of rules formulated to guide the behavior of Wisconsin judges likewise restrict the activities of a lawyer who set up a committee to monitor advertising during the current election campaign for Butler's seat on the court.

At the same time, however, Suhr evidently also believes the rules of "strict constructionism" don't apply to him, at least in his role as self-appointed political advisor to the campaign of Justice Butler's rival, Michael Gableman.

"We will see how committed WJCIC chairman Tom Basting is to a very strict interpretation of the ethics rules and impartial judging by how he handles the question of his own recusal," predicts the college Republican.

Sadly, Daniel Suhr himself isn't much committed to very strict interpretations of legal language because, for one thing, "recusal" is a concept that applies specifically to judges. And, for another, the set of guidelines Suhr expects Atty. Basting to abide by don't apply to Atty. Basting anyway. You'd think the title of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules that Suhr cites would have tipped him off: "Code of Judicial Conduct."

"Strictly" speaking, lawyers don't recuse themselves. But according to the looser construction favored by Daniel Suhr, it's amusing to see him conveniently recusing himself from the very principle of adjudication to which he claims his favored candidate is devoted.

What's also funny is that those who objected to the WJCIC in the first place, including Daniel Suhr's mentor, were motivated by fears that the committee would force its own slanted view of the Rules onto the conduct of the political campaign, thereby raising questions of First Amendment violations. The irony is, well, pretty much constant.

What Suhr really wants to try and accuse Atty. Basting of is a conflict of interest. But I don't know what theory he's going to come up with to make that stand. Throw something out there, see if it sticks.

While it's true that Atty. Basting is an officer of the court, so are me and Mike Plaisted. You can find the letter(s) the young GOPer has his Republican panties in a bunch over at this link.

[Please visit the iT Butler/Gableman archive.]

February 12, 2008

Result orientation, the good WMC kind

Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce has a new webpage up touting its new video that appeared on YouTube over the weekend. The video, which displays mug shots of the Justices under the rubrics "activist" and "traditionalist," is purported to contain a "full briefing" on issues relating to Louis Butler and the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Obviously it isn't a full briefing on anything by any stretch of the imagination, but here's a few tidbits that might help in formulating a fuller briefing as to the disingenuous games WMC is playing.

Michael Gableman, the Burnett County judge who's challenging Butler in an April 1 election, is described by WMC as a "traditionalist." This is fascinating, because while the WMC claims its "activist" labels are supported by data from a study commissioned from some outfit in Oklahoma, the competing "traditionalist" labels, as applied to Gableman and WMC's last favored candidate, Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler, are supported by ... nothing.

The webpage also features a number of links to political brochures comparing, as WMC sees it, the relative merits of Butler and Gableman and, under the heading "Resources," no less than five in a row invoking our good friend, Prof. Rick Esenberg of Marquette Law School and Federalist Society fame.

The Oklahoma outfit, Sequoyah Information Systems, Inc., is the brainchild of Marc Nuttle, a conservative Republican activist associated with, among other things, the presidential aspirations of celebrated zany "Rev." Pat Robertson. The Sequoyah, Inc. "judicial report" mentioned in the WMC video is also linked at the page.

The 14-page document is virtually identical to another prepared in 2005 "evaluating" the judges on an Alabama appeals court. Both consist of mostly boilerplate language describing, for example, the role of judges and how the civil appellate process works. For comparison, the Alabama document is here (.pdf; 14 pgs.).

And both contain a colorful bar graph featuring each judge's name accompanied by a figure expressed in percentage supposedly representative of each judge's "score," which Sequoyah, Inc. coyly admits is based on "a particular substantive-policy point of view."

Scrolling through the boilerplate in each document leads to a title page which promises, in gigantic font, "Case Index." Ah, here we are, at long last, the data relied on to produce WMC's conclusion that Justice Butler possesses "the second worst record on the court."

Except the title page is the final page of each document — there is no "case index." Where is it? Doesn't WMC want us to have a peek? If not, why not?

I think I know why. Because WMC itself is 110% "result oriented." They don't really care so much what reasoning was employed to reach the dispositions in whatever cases Sequoyah, Inc. used to prepare its bar graphs. They only care whether the decisions, however arrived at and however reasoned, have a tendency to favor the plaintiffs or the corporate defendants in civil liability actions.

And because, no matter what, favoring civil plaintiffs is bad and favoring civil defendants is good (except when it comes to criminal cases, where the evil vs. righteousness test is necessarily and automatically reversed: then, government good, defendant bad).

What makes WMC's results orientedness even more peculiar are the views of Judge Diane Sykes, the former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice since appointed to the federal 7th Circuit by President George W. Bush. In 2006, Judge Sykes delivered a lecture at her alma mater, Marquette Law School, in which she criticized the State high court for its own results orientedness: "pure, unvarnished result orientation," to be precise.

When courts or individual judges are criticized for being results oriented, it means they have the decision they want in mind before they set about the exercise of opinion formulating, and the clear implication is that they select and manipulate the facts and the law to suit their own personal preferences. It's not a compliment, nor an expression meant to be flattering by any means.

Another remarkable aspect of all this is that Judge Sykes's lecture figures prominently in both Rick Esenberg's Federalist Society paper, "A Court Unbound?" and young GOPer and would-be Gableman operative Daniel Suhr's series of "white papers." The same accusations have also turned up in a number of Gableman campaign statements and indeed, in statements made by Gableman himself.

So, here we have WMC relying on a set of clearly related criticisms of Louis Butler's "result orientation," demanding "result orientation" of its own, in its own favor, and talking up a candidate who promises "result orientation" in "stark contrast" to that of the incumbent, for the purpose of satisying WMC's desired "result orientation."

Isn't that special? Apparently, result orientation can be a good thing too, but if and only if it's oriented toward the result you want. Otherwise it's bad. One thing's for sure, WMC's own "pure, unvarnished result orientation" is a hell of a lot easier to prove than is Justice Butler's, which is 110% an exercise in mental telepathy.

[Please visit the iT Butler/Gableman archive.]

February 11, 2008

Shark for the defense, part 2

Prof. Rick Esenberg has released the latest in what is currently a four-part series entitled, "Setting the record straight." I suspect there may be some straightening of the record contained somewhere in these missives, but there's also a not inconsiderable amount of warping it.

To wit, the following, in response to my "Over the rainbow and out to lunch" of Feb. 2. "Although," as Esenberg puts it, "more for finding a point of departure than to offer rebuttal." But he can't resist attempting a few shark bites here and there, italicized below, so let's at least "set the record straight" on those.
"[I]n addition to all these longstanding case precedents [Butler] cited, I remember reading one case where he cited The Wizard of Oz and based decisions on social science studies that were manufactured at colleges and universities." — Judge Michael Gableman
[W]hile I doubt that there was any nefarious intent, it is a bit of a malapropism here.

This is one of the reasons I enjoy Esenberg's blog: for the belly laughs. Indeed, this may well be one of the cleverest sentences he's ever constructed. You have to admire the choice of words, "nefarious" vs. "malapropism." On the one hand, the most extreme interpretation possible (very wicked, evil, immoral, sinful, vicious) and on the other, a mere jovial slip of the tongue, and only "a bit of" one, at that.

Esenberg has been following politics — and been a lawyer — long enough to get what Gableman was saying. But he deserves credit for the hilarious dichotomy he offers.

Then Esenberg casually dismisses "manufactured" as "a bit of populist flourish." As I'm fond of saying, I was born at night, but not last night. And I understand conservative-speak as well as anyone: manufactured at colleges and universities = fabricated from whole cloth by leftist academics. We know the code too. No wonder Esenberg wants to set these statements of Gableman's aside! Good for him on that account, at least.

IT emphasizes how complicated DuBose is and we hear that in judicial elections. You can't judge a decision, we are told, unless you read the briefs, heard the argument and know enough law to place it in context. So lay off.

And this is one of the reasons I sometimes don't enjoy Esenberg's blog, because that was hardly my conclusion at all. I said that complexity often doesn't lend itself to sound bites and in particular, ridiculous and fact-averse sound bites such as the example I gave. I never suggested that anybody ought to "lay off."

As a matter of fact, I'm grateful for some of the wild claims issuing from the Gableman campaign and its supporters; it's been entertaining making fun of them. I'm looking forward to their continuation, and there's little question in my mind that there will be many, many more to come.

By way of an analogy, it's sometimes said that people like me, who don't believe in God, actually need God more than people who do believe in God, because we like to talk about God so much, if only for entertainment and arguendo purposes, whereas people who do believe in God are less inclined to investigate the God-details. There's some truth to that!

In fact, suggesting that a critic has manufactured an issue because there is more to it than the limitations of campaign spots will allow, is, in its own way, also misleading.

Now I'm being misleading by describing how misleading it is for Gableman to suggest Butler relied on "The Wizard of Oz" to reach a disposition in an opinion he didn't even write? Esenberg is too clever by half, I must say. Except this particular manufacture was deployed during a 75-minute debate without any such limitations. Will it turn up in a campaign spot? We'll see, I guess. I hope so, for the reasons set forth above.

This is why it was fair for Daniel Suhr to say that Justice Butler "especially defended" use of the studies. He was responding to Justice Roggensack's criticism of their use.

Well, not exactly. More specifically, he was responding to the self-undermining logical disconnect apparent in Roggensack's dissent, in that on the one hand she was using the studies in support of an argument while simultaneously dismissing them as "disputed social science theory."

In other words, 'You can't have it both ways,' is pretty much all he was saying. If you're going to rely on a set of statistical findings, then you can't dismiss the same data as "disputed theory." Do they support your argument, or not. That's actually a criticism of the use Roggensack put to the studies, not a defense. Criticism and defense, they're sorta at the opposite ends of a continuum, kinda like "nefarious" and "malapropism."

But I suppose Suhr can say anything he wants, and has.

Finally, there is this comment under Esenberg's post, from the dependable fan of strawmannery and red herringing, Dad29:
"Complexity" and "nuance" are generally used to derogate arguments from Common Sense.

I am reminded of a pertinent quotation from Sydney Smith: "He not only overflowed with learning, but stood in the slop."
Which just goes to show that no matter how effectively is the lie put to the Gableman campaign's clumsy efforts at negative campaigning, they will nevertheless find a receptive audience of eager dupes.

If there's a better argument against the popular election of State Supreme Court justices than the mere existence of such willfully gullible electors, it eludes me at the moment.

[Please visit the iT Butler/Gableman archive.]

February 7, 2008

The anti-Federalist Society

Esteemed counsel Mike Plaisted has thrown down another priceless commentary related to the April 1 election contest between Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Louis Butler and Judge Michael Gableman of Burnett County. I offer the link partly in self-serving recognition of his generously framed glances in my direction, but also for a couple of other reasons.

The first is to note the obvious: Plaisted's central point addressing young GOPer Daniel Suhr's regurgitation of the Gableman campaign's thus far unsupported claim that Justice Butler "consistently sides with criminals over law enforcement" is completely ignored by Suhr when he turns up in Plaisted's comments thread.

Suhr, who describes the claim as "an effective punch from the Gableman campaign," instead uses the opportunity to break the news that Microsoft now allows us to convert Word documents to Adobe Acrobat files and to confirm how much he likes his bibliography of, as Plaisted puts it, "Everyone Who Said Anything Bad About Butler."

Earlier, Mr. Suhr got himself definitively schooled on statistical methodology by Clutch, another highly instructive comment that, for one reason or another, Suhr chose not to respond to.

I should add that I happen to know what Clutch does for a living and, without revealing too much, can reasonably predict that he would easily qualify as an expert witness in the discipline according to either the Frye or the Daubert standards (those are two U.S. Supreme Court cases that address the elements of how to go about evaluating the admission of expert testimony).

That Suhr insists on regarding the Gableman claim as an "effective punch" while continuing to ignore requests that he support it serves only as more confirmation that Suhr's project is 95% GOP politics and 5% reading the cases (and the latter only where they allegedly provide positive servicing of the former).

Instead, what Suhr and Rick Esenberg — who also makes an appearance in Plaisted's comments — object to is Plaisted's suggestion that Esenberg and Suhr were somehow in league over the production of Suhr's "research briefings," which he's since helpfully forwarded to the Gableman campaign.

While you can't blame either of them for denying it, you can hardly fault Plaisted for putting it forth either. Plaisted has documented a number of connections between Marquette Law School, the Federalist Society, and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, the latter two outfits being among the anti-Butler forces.

As for the law school itself, it should be noted that Esenberg's boss, the individual who brought him aboard the faculty, Dean Joseph Kearney, is himself a Federalist Society man. And Dean Kearney can boast the most impeccable Fed Soc credential of all: he clerked for Justice Antonin Scalia.

For Esenberg's part, he's written a series of lengthy posts attempting to rebut some of the things I've said here. The posts, although entitled, "Setting the record straight," rebut very little. The detail he finally did catch me on by the third in the series I acknowledged immediately and added a correction to the original post.

What Esenberg's series does is explain some of the philosophical groundwork for Esenberg's own objections to Louis Butler's jurisprudence, at least as Esenberg sees it. That is legitimate commentary and he does not ineptly or misleadingly manipulate the law to make his point. His Fed Soc paper, "A Court Unbound?" is available here, is very well written, and is well worth reading.

(As mentioned previously, "A Court Unbound" is the theme of WMC's World Tour of Breakfasts, which kicks off next week.)

A Consistency Unbound By Political Convenience?

Now for some philosophical observations of my own. The Federalist Society gets its name and purports to take its guidance from James Madison. Of all the Framers of the Constitution, Madison was its most assiduous assembler and defender. He, together with Alexander Hamilton, is one of the principal authors of the Federalist Papers, a series of 85 brilliant polemics in defense of the Constitution that appeared in the New York press in the immediate aftermath of the Constitution's drafting during the summer of 1787.

The Federalist position initially was that the Constitution did not require a Bill of Rights, because federal power was already self-limiting, expressed as it was in a series of specifically enumerated powers; for example, Article I, Section 8, which sets forth the powers of Congress (most of them). Ultimately the anti-Federalist forces, who distrusted federal power in favor of local control, won out, and Madison himself shepherded the Bill of Rights through Congress. The Bill of Rights consists of either the first eight or the first ten of the Amendments to the Constitution, depending on which scholar you read.

Regardless, the heart of the Bill of Rights is a set of protections against the government afforded to criminal defendants, contained in the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th Amendments. While these restrictions originally applied only to the federal government, they have since been deemed applicable to the States through the legal force of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, which is a directive to the States.

Additionally, the States have their own bills of rights, the language of which in many instances is identical, or functionally identical ("substantially similar," in the lawyerly vernacular) to the federal Bill of Rights.

The U.S. Supreme Court is charged by the Constitution with interpreting the scope of the federal protections and, hence, these must be followed by the States, as a minimum. In other words, the States may interpret not only the federal Bill of Rights more broadly than has the U.S. Supreme Court, but they may interpret their own State bills of rights more broadly than has the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the federal Bill of Rights.

For example, there is nothing in the federal constitutional scheme that forbids a State from finding a police search unreasonable even though the U.S. Supreme Court may have found a similar search not unreasonable.

Lately, ironically, we have Federalist Society members and their fellow travelers denouncing as "activist" opinions of Justice Butler's that they claim reject federal control, in the form of U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the Bill of Rights, in favor of self-determination by the State of Wisconsin, by way of its own interpretation of its own State bill of rights.

Ironic because this is precisely the sort of State power the anti-Federalists sought to preserve. Now here are the self-styled Federalists criticizing Justice Butler for exercising it.

Go figure.

[Please visit the iT Butler/Gableman archive.]

February 2, 2008

Gableman: Over the rainbow and out to lunch

Last Tuesday during his debate with Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Louis Butler, Burnett County Judge Michael Gableman let fly this startling little shot across the bow:
[Butler] has a substantial and consistent history of legislating from the bench and we don't have too look far or long to find a series of cases that reflect that. I think what he said here today sounded very good, but in addition to all these longstanding case precedents he cited, I remember reading one case where he cited The Wizard of Oz and based decisions on social science studies that were manufactured at colleges and universities.
Gableman was apparently referring to a 2005 decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court called State v. Dubose (.pdf; 63 pgs.).

Gableman's remark is instructive for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it raises the question whether he even knows what he's talking about. As for 'citation,' it's a term of art, and it means something specific to lawyers. Aspirants to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in my opinion, shouldn't play fast and loose with legal terms of art for the sake of mugging in front of the crowd.

It's not only misleading, it's dishonest, because one would expect Judge Gableman to fully understand what is meant by them.

First of all, Dubose was authored by Justice Patrick Crooks, not Butler. Second, Dubose embodies a very complicated due process analysis that involves revisiting a number of Wisconsin and U.S. Supreme Court cases in light of a considerable amount of more recently obtained empirical data having to do with the reliability of eyewitness evidence, and in particular evidence gathered through a certain type of police identification procedure. To put it mildly, Dubose does not lend itself to one-liner soundbites, especially the utterly nonsensical one offered by Gableman.

And one has to be especially careful reading Dubose because it contains three separate dissents, by Justices Wilcox, Prosser, and Roggensack. Each takes issue with the majority opinion for different reasons. It requires some serious work just to tease out the competing strands of analysis in Dubose, let alone portray it accurately for the layperson. To reduce it to, "He cited The Wizard of Oz" is, on a charitable reading, an act of negligence and, to my mind at least, raises a concern as to Gableman's suitability for the position he seeks.

While Butler joins Crooks's DuBose opinion in full, he writes separately only to shed light on a failure he detects in Justice Roggensack's dissent. To wit, Roggensack relies, at one point, on the very data she had derided as "disputed social science theory" only a few paragraphs previous. That's about the entire thrust of Butler's very brief concurring opinion. His apparent sin, to return to Gableman's dishonest characterization, was to criticize Roggensack's skepticism over the empirical data by saying this:
Unless, and until, we improve eyewitness identification procedures so that the likelihood of irreparable misidentification is significantly reduced, we can no longer proceed as though all is good in the Land of Oz.
That's it. A figure of speech, hardly the "citation" that Gableman would attempt to have us believe.

Incidentally, our good friend Daniel Suhr is also completely wrong (surprise) when he claims that Butler wrote to "especially defend" the majority's use of the empirical data. He was not "especially defending" the majority, he was "especially criticizing" one of the dissents for a glaring error of reasoning. It is notable, however, that Suhr also makes an issue of Butler's offhand reference to the "Land of Oz." It's almost as if Gableman was presented with Suhr's "Research Briefing" in preparation for his debate with Butler. D'ya think?

Suhr, by the way, can be more easily excused for his ineptitude than can Gableman, since Suhr hasn't sworn his lawyer's oath yet. (If there's a god in heaven, my humble prayer to her or him is that Daniel Suhr pulls Justice Butler for his swearing-in ceremony.)

Gableman's portrayal of empirical data as "manufactured" at colleges and universities is also quite telling, and he is kidding himself — and the Wisconsin electorate — if he thinks he'll just be able to laugh off relevant empirical studies prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice if and when he finds himself on the Supreme Court.

It's often said that there's a crock of gold at the end of the rainbow, but it appears that Judge Gableman is entertaining us to a crock of something else, something more fragrant than gold.

[Please visit the iT Butler/Gableman archive.]

February 1, 2008

Friday fallacy funnies

One of my pet peeves (I tend to cultivate a number of them) turns on the expression "ad hominem" as it is often popularly applied. Many people think it means simply "insult," as if calling someone a stooge or a buffoon is an ad hominem. Not so.

Argumentum ad hominem (argument against the man, or person) is a type of logical fallacy, committed when one attempts to undermine an opponent's argument by claiming something about the opponent's character affects the quality of the argument itself. The fallacy obtains from the fact that there is no logical connection between the argument stated and the character of the person putting forward the argument. In other words, bad people can make good arguments; being bad cannot per se make your argument bad.

Misunderstandings over what ad hominem means are not confined to your garden variety Daily Kos comment-leaving trolls, either. Consider the following, from a quartet of well-heeled Milwaukee attorneys working for silk stocking firms down the road from your humble correspondent:
False advertisements or ad hominem attacks are never appropriate. But Wisconsin citizens are smart enough to distinguish between fair criticism and scurrilous smears.
"Scurrilous smears" are not in and of themselves ad hominem. While ad hominem may involve a scurrilous smear, ad hominem requires that the smear is put to use for the purpose of undermining an otherwise perfectly valid and well supported argument. A smear or an insult standing alone are just those, a smear or an insult.

Another thing about the ad hominem is that they are often easy to find, although truly textbook quality examples are less common. By fortuitous coincidence I just happened to find one this morning at, of all places, the online lair of one Daniel Suhr (see below) made all the more comical by the website's title block, which declares the entire domain to be devoted to "Systematically Debunking Liberal Rhetoric."

Here, let me show you it.

Following a wistful missive entitled, "I'm tired of John McCain's lies," a fellow named Gregory chimes in to offer a number of eminently reasonable observations on the recent GOP Florida presidential primary. Moments later, the aforementioned Suhrian associate Brian, author of the wistful missive, rejoins:
Gregory,

You’re a Democrat. That isn’t an accusation, that’s a fact. Do you think I’m going to take anything you say seriously? Of course liberals like you prefer McCain to Romney. So does the collectivist New Yawk Times.
That, ladies and gentlemen, is worthy of submittal to Prentice Hall.

And the spanking continues

Oh my deary, deary me.

Of State v. Knapp, the anti-Butler forces' signature criminal case:
What you leave out with this creative use of the passive voice is the fact that the police INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED THE SUSPECT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS specifically to obtain such a statement. This is not a case, as you suggest, of the police inadvertently failing to follow some obscure rule, but an intentional violation of the constitution. In fact, such a violation can be a federal crime. I think it’s 18 U.S.C. s.241 - violation of civil rights under color of state law.
Sounds familiar. That intentional violation was precisely the reason the Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished its decision from United States v. Patane, the U.S. Supreme Court plurality opinion to which Daniel Suhr claimed Justice Butler "arrogantly" failed to "defer." In fact Butler also pointed this out during his online debate with Michael Gableman on Tuesday, when Gableman attempted to go after him over Knapp. Gableman had no response, incidentally, only the initial talking point. Said T.P. is not holding up real well.

And I believe Atty. Henak is referring to 42 U.S. § 14141, known in Department of Justice circles as the Police Misconduct Statute.

[eta: My mistake; see Atty. Henak's comment below. - iT]

There's more:
Let me get this right. Gableman’s campaign makes a statement that is demonstrably false, i.e., that Butler “consistently sides with criminals over law enforcement.” Butler then calls him on it and presents the facts that he has voted to affirm convictions in 98% of the cases presented to the Court. And you say that Butler is the one spinning the facts????? Get real!
And this coup de grâce:
Over the years, I have represented many people who were convicted of crimes it ultimately turned out they did not commit. Most of those reversals, by the way, were entered by the federal courts stacked with right-wing, GOP-appointed judges after the Wisconsin state courts had upheld the convictions.
Those crazy, madcap liberal activists! (Many of whom were appointees of the canonized St. Ronald Reagan, no doubt.)

Three more spankings, in a row, commencing here. Check 'em out.

Any suggestion that the hilariously ambitious Republican trickster Daniel Suhr quit while he's behind is not an attempt to stifle speech, but rather purely an expression of compassionate conservatism.

[Please visit the iT Butler/Gableman archive.]

Suhr spanked. Hard. Again.

Remember Daniel Suhr, the would-be GOP operative whose laughably dishonest attempts at scholarship were debunked right here? Sure you do. Doubtless young Daniel is favoring his tender posterior following on its latest unequivocal reaming. A daintier sample:
You and others attacking Justice Butler apparently want a right-wing automaton; someone who will automatically side with the police or the prosecutor regardless of the facts or the law. While I doubt that Judge Gableman would go that far, one wouldn’t know given the misleading propaganda attacking Justice Butler.
Ouchies. Read it all. Can't say he wasn't asking for it.

Comes GOP3 colleague Brian's devastating retort:
I try not to bore myself first with reading long liberal rants about the living constitution and second almost anything out of the mouth of lawyers.

I’ll leave Daniel to respond to inane thoughts about the law.
I'll admit D. Suhr, Esq. is uniquely qualified to dispense those.

[Please visit the iT Butler/Gableman archive.]

January 25, 2008

Fruit of the poisoned mind

We've already seen how the young GOP operative Daniel Suhr, in an effort to paint Louis Butler as a detriment to the "safety, prosperity, and health of the citizens of many states," completely misrepresented two criminal appeals cases, Cleaver and Farris.

It just so turns out that that mispresentation extends to a "GOP Triumvirate" of cases, the third being a Vermont decision from last year called State v. Peterson.

Declares Suhr: "In State v. Peterson, the Vermont Supreme Court cited Knapp and two other state supreme court decisions when holding that the Vermont Constitution provided broader pre-Miranda evidence gathering protection than the U.S. Constitution."

Once again, the Vermont court reached its conclusion independently of Knapp. It did not rely on Knapp in any sense whatsoever. Like the Ohio case, Farris, the Peterson court simply "notes" that it happens to have reached a disposition similar to Knapp. Knapp isn't presented as an authority for the Peterson result at all.

While Suhr's language is a bit more coy this time around — 'Peterson cited Knapp when holding ...' — it most certainly doesn't belong in a list of cases devoted to the proposition that the baleful presence of Louis Butler is infecting the jurisprudence of courts throughout the land and who, by extension, must be deposed.

Peterson turns on an analysis of United States v. Patane, the U.S. Supreme Court decision that also figured prominently in Knapp. But Patane is assessed in light of the Vermont Supreme Court's own prior holdings, certainly not those of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and most definitely not those of Louis Butler.

A proper — and honest — treatment of Peterson would have been, 'Peterson cited Knapp after holding ....' But of course this wouldn't have supported Suhr's personal opinion that Louis Butler is a menace to civilization as we know it. Unfortunately, none of these three cases, Cleaver, Farris, or Peterson, even support Suhr's personal opinion. This is unvarnished political attack against Justice Butler, and what doesn't appear to figure prominently in it is honesty.

Well, that's enough of that. I see no point in checking any more of Daniel Suhr's disingenuous politicking. Three strikes. In a row.

Yer out.

Oh, by the way, I notice that Counsellor Mike Plaisted, in the course of his fine work here, links to a supposedly politically influential local conservative blogger, who opines:
Daniel Suhr of GOP3 has done a great service by analyzing all of Justice Butler’s opinions to evaluate his judicial philosophy.
Uh huh. It's a service alright.

January 24, 2008

Suhr takes another Knapp

Further to my post below, I had occasion to look at the case following immediately on Daniel Suhr's reference to State v. Cleaver.

As discussed previously, in his latest piece of anti-Louis Butler politicking, Suhr wonders whether (1) State v. Knapp has been "used as precedent for further decisions," and whether (2) "other courts [have] accepted or rejected the rationale and rule offered[.]"

He then presents a purported example of the foregoing from Ohio, State v. Farris (.pdf; 20 pgs.).

Of Farris, Suhr writes: "[T]he Ohio Supreme Court cited Knapp and one other state supreme court decision to hold that the Ohio Constitution provided broader pre-Miranda evidence gathering protection than the U.S. Constitution." Emphases added.

The impression Suhr is attempting to convey, clearly, is that the Ohio court relied on Knapp, or used Knapp as authority in support of its disposition. Except it didn't. The Farris court reached its conclusion independently, based on, among other things, previous holdings of the Ohio Supreme Court. But not Knapp.

The sole mention of Knapp in the entire opinion is as an aside. The Farris court simply observes, at the conclusion of its own independent analysis, that its decision happens to put Ohio in accord with Wisconsin on a particular question of law. That's it, that's all. No reliance on Knapp, and no citation to Knapp as authority.

So, as for the Ohio case of State v. Farris, the answer to Suhr's own two questions are (1) No and (2) Neither. To be sure, Knapp was not used as precedent in Farris. And Farris neither accepted nor rejected Knapp's "rationale and rule."

Which raises the question: Why in the world is Suhr using this Ohio case in support of his premise that Knapp has "been relied on by parties in Wisconsin and in other jurisdictions scores of times"?

The answer, obviously, is that Suhr has a preordained political thesis in mind, has set about gathering evidence in support of that thesis, and has few qualms about presenting as "evidence" citations to the law that, on closer inspection, in no way support his conclusion.

Additionally, there is a dissent in Farris. It's worth mentioning that while the dissenters disagree with the majority, their disagreement has nothing to do with Knapp either. Rather, their fundamental objection turns on whether the circumstances of a police confiscation of a bag of marijuana following a traffic stop should be evaluated according to the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause or the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause. The dissenters don't mention Knapp at all.

Nor has Suhr any legitimate business mentioning Farris for the purpose of maligning Justice Butler. Bad form, Daniel.