[Good grief man.]
Mr. Suhr, thank you for taking the time. I must say I have always found kibbutzing with you on the internets a source of considerable amusement and I am sincerely grateful for that as well.
However, please have a look one more time at § 809.71, which refers back to and incorporates by that reference § 809.51. A person seeking a supervisory writ under § 809.71 (e.g., petitioner Mike Huebsch [a.k.a. Scott Walker] who, incidentally, ended up getting something he never sought by dint of the punctuational jurisdiction invented by Justice/Gableman) must file "in accordance with s. 809.51." Thus does "the court" in § 809.51 mean the Supreme Court, in perfect consonance with the wise and premonitory guidance set forth in § 809.01(4).
So to continue to insist, as you are doing above, that "the court" in § 809.51 can mean "only" the Court of Appeals is, as the saying goes, absurd. Again: I am not misapplying § 809.51 but rather reading it in its alternate context, following the direction of § 809.71.
The only thing in § 809.51 that § 809.71 does not incorporate by reference is, obviously, the former's language, "or its original jurisdiction," which is where your superfluity analysis would apply, as the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is addressed separately, in § 809.70.
And these have been my contentions from the outset: that original and supervisory jurisdiction are separate and distinct forms of judicial authority, and that there is no constitutional basis for Justice/Gableman's creation of an alternatively convenient source of judicial power by forward slash.
(Setting amusement aside for a moment, your main post here at the Marquette University Law School faculty blog embodies an unwarranted criticism of my writing and I can only hope that your readers continue on throughout this comments thread for the fuller explication. However, experience teaches me that that is not something upon which I can depend, if you're picking up what I'm throwing down.)
By the way, a not dissimilar question of construction arose at the time the Walker administration attempted vainly to claim publication of 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 while publication was temporarily enjoined. A provision might have two different meanings, or two different applications, depending upon how it may be incorporated by reference into other statutory provisions.
You can read all about that little brouhaha at my own wildly popular blog, illusory tenant, in a post entitled, "Wisconsin statutes, a couple three of them," of March 26, 2011. Or, if you prefer, Prof. Fallone's compelling epistle of March 28, at this present location, [*] which covers much of the same ground (as Prof. Fallone was most generous to acknowledge).
Have a good one, Mr. Suhr, and keep those FedSoc recruits coming.
* That is, the Marquette University Law School faculty blog, to whence the above comment was submitted. Should be posted in a day or two.