Showing posts sorted by date for query Caperton. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Caperton. Sort by relevance Show all posts

July 13, 2011

Wisconsin Supreme Court quote of the day

As to the court's latest unsigned order:
That Justice Roggensack participates in this motion for reconsideration is not a due process or ethical calculation but a mathematical one: one vote plus three votes equals an attempt to achieve a majority. — SSA, AWB, NPC, dissenting
Ouf.

State v. Dimitri Henley, 2011 WI 67:
Nor is the majority’s explication of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. compelling. If due process were satisfied merely by the individual justice's ruling on recusal, then how could the U.S. Supreme Court have held that "due process requires recusal" because of the probability of that justice’s actual bias?
Bold added.

Maybe we'll find out. This unsigned order, unlike the court's previous unsigned order, presents questions of federal, constitutional law.

The protections of which, the dissenters argue, were not only denied but denied in favor of other, er, less legally substantive considerations.

"Strict construction," "textualism," "original intent," and all the rest of the conservative tropes pretty much fail when it comes to due process.

There's little guidance in the text of the Constitution as to what due process means and what little guidance there is must be gleaned from ancillary provisions. In such divinations conservatives tend to be every bit as lawless and unmoored from language as they accuse liberals of being.

Also:
[Troupis] has been helping Mike Gableman in his legal defense in an ethics investigation by the Office of Lawyer Regulation — an investigation for which Gableman could be disbarred.
Is this true?

April 8, 2011

WMC Motors unveils 2012 Shark coupé

It goes from desperate* to triumphalist in under seven seconds.

* By comparison the prof's cockamamie "Kloppenburg has a Caperton problem" theory makes my own "Obscenity is necessarily protected political speech because it's prosecuted by elected district attorneys" theory look like the fashionings of freakin' Learned Hand over here.

March 25, 2011

Taking it to Justice Prosser, and pretty hard

On the attack (30 sec. video spot):
David Prosser refused to prosecute a priest

Hardball. And that there is slouching towards Gableman (the distinction being that Gableman's own slouch was an Authorized By Gableman Production, whereas this is third-party speechifying).

But hey if you're a conservative who loves you some Citizens United* and are inclined to hoot down campaign finance reform, deal with it.

Not to mention believing it's a fabulous idea to elect justices. If there was any pretense remaining that the election coming in eleven days is anything other than a referendum for political control of the non-political branch of government, abandon that pretense forthwith.

(It's also likely to be all about voter turnout in Milwaukee County. If Prosser's opponents can GTFOTV there, they'll be well on their way.)

* With a side of carefully spun Caperton v. Massey for good measure.

eta: Told ya it was slouching towards Gableman.

It's always a deadly serious concern of criminal prosecutors, whether to put victims of child sexual assault through the trial process grinder and without knowing the full complement of facts, it's difficult not to give then-Outagamie County DA Prosser the benefit of the doubt.

And yes, the DA often knows better than the victim what's in store.

In more than one sense, this is like dredging up Louis Butler's public defender work, as became a central issue in the spring 2008 election. But thanks to Gableman, the GWC's speech is vigorously protected.

Nevertheless, I don't think political interest groups owe any allegiance to the ABA's canons of professional ethics and courtesy. The GWC's canons are much less restrictive. The trouble arises when judicial candidates abandon their professional guidelines for political ones.

July 8, 2010

WMC authors the Wisconsin judicial ethics rules

Excerpted from testimony before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, with emphases supplied:
The rule in [Caperton v. Massey] was that due process requires a judge to recuse where the judge's impartiality is in question. And in that case, the rule there is that a court must take into account all of the facts and the circumstances surrounding — whether it's spending or a contribution — or whatever other facts are present that are challenging that judge's ability to be impartial.
— Counsel for Wisconsin Realtors Association, 10/29/09
As difficult as it may be to believe, the notorious business outfit Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce and the Wisconsin Realtors Association wrote three rules of judicial ethics that were ordered effective by four members of the Supreme Court yesterday.

The order came attached with some more of the court's "writings," this time featuring Justice Bradley squaring off against Justice Roggensack, the latter having helped formed the majority along with Justices Prosser, Ziegler, and Gableman ("the conservatives").

WMC contributed millions to the political campaigns of Justices Ziegler and Gableman, but Wisconsinites needn't pay any mind to the troubling perceptions created thereby, the majority teaches today.

One of the WMC/court's new rules is 60.06(7), which dictates that a judge is not required to stand aside from hearing a case "based solely on any endorsement or the judge's campaign committee's receipt of a lawful campaign contribution, including a campaign contribution from an individual or entity involved in the proceeding."

The other newly created rule is 60.04(8), which confers the same protection upon a judge when an "independent communication" (e.g., one of WMC's infamous issue advocacy advertisements) is produced by a party to the case, or where a party to the case contributed to the production costs of the "independent communication."

(The latter "individual[s] or entit[ies]" are more often than not operating behind a veil of anonymity anyway.)

Amended by the WMC/court is 60.06(4), which already had purportedly prohibited judges from personally soliciting campaign contributions, directing them instead to gathering up cash monies through a committee. Although: "A judge, candidate for judicial office, or judge-elect may serve on the committee but should avoid direct involvement with the committee's fundraising efforts." Emphasis added. It's one of those "aspirational" rules.

Significantly, the amendment allows a judge's fundraising committee (with whose activities a judge aspirationally "should" avoid direct involvement) to drum up cash from contributors "even though the contributor may be involved in a proceeding in which the judge, candidate for judicial office, or judge-elect is likely to participate."

The meaning and potential effect of the latter provision isn't entirely clear. As Justice Bradley (joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Crooks, "the liberals") points out:
[U]nder the majority's new rules, which mark a substantial departure from our current practice, judges' campaign committees and perhaps someday even judges themselves will be able to ask for and receive contributions from litigants before the trial has begun and before the judge makes a decision in their case. . . .

Justice Prosser clarified at the January 21, 2010, open administrative conference that indeed the intent is to allow for the solicitation and receipt of a contribution from a litigant with a case currently pending before the judge.
Justice Roggensack, without a hint of irony, pronounced that "Justice Bradley's dissent is a political statement that will foster disrespect for and distrust of the Wisconsin Supreme Court as an institution."

Roggensack criticized Bradley for citing a number of newspaper editorials (nine of them, to be exact, all in substantial agreement) which expressed concern over the majority's move to adopt verbatim rules written by organized corporate interests, effectively "thumb[ing] their noses at the perception of connections between large campaign contributions and the court's integrity, objectivity and credibility," as the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel had put it.

The majority appears to be largely unconcerned about those public perceptions, and moreover the majority appears unconcerned that those concerns even exist, let alone for those concerns' validity. Nevertheless, perceptions about the courts' objectivity play a substantive role in evaluating due process of law challenges.

A party to a lawsuit is placed in an uncomfortable position where the presiding judge's campaign committee (again, with which the judge "should" not — as opposed to "must" not — be involved) is actively soliciting cash money from the other party. Yet that is precisely a situation the majority's order contemplates and, seemingly, allows.

Justice Roggensack, somewhat inexplicably, claims the new and amended rules are grounded in the right to vote in elections.

But see the well (and rightly so) respected Michael B. Brennan:
Although the judiciary is elected in Wisconsin, it was never intended to directly carry out the wishes of the voters.
The court's remarkable order is available here (.pdf; 28 pgs.).

As usual, more later.

October 28, 2009

Well, this sure cleared that up

Or: A rule of law, you say? Depends who's asking.

Michael Gableman: Was Caperton a unanimous decision?

Hannah Renfro:* No, it was not.

Gableman: What was the vote?

Renfro: It was a, um, a 5-4 vote, I believe.

Gableman: And were the five members of the majority able to articulate a rule that would carry forward outside of the particular facts of Caperton v. Massey Coal Company?

Renfro: No, they were not. In fact that was emphasized by the dissent.

Shirley Abrahamson: They stated no rule at all, Ms. Renfro?

Renfro: Well, they stated a rule ...

Abrahamson: They stated a rule that you might not think is effective; the dissent didn't think it's effective. But that's the purpose of a dissent, to knock it around. Right?

Renfro: Yes.

Abrahamson: So they did state a rule, right?

Renfro: Yes.

Abrahamson: And what was the rule?

Renfro: The rule in that case was that due process requires a judge to recuse where the judge's impartiality is in question. And in that case, the rule there is that a court must take into account all of the facts and the circumstances surrounding — whether it's spending or a contribution — or whatever other facts are present that are challenging that judge's ability to be impartial.**

Abrahamson: An objective, reasonable person standard.

Renfro: Yes.

Abrahamson: Not only actual bias but the appearance of bias.

Renfro: Yes.

* Attorney for the Wisconsin Realtors Association.

** Initiating the solicitation of this response was not exactly a bold strategic move by Gableman, under the circumstances. (However, his attempts at divining the shadowy presence of George Soros in the courtroom were likely a big hit with the tea ceremonialist crowd.)

The Chief Justice, on the other hand, is one sharp cookie.

Bonus Question: Was Coulee v. LIRC a unanimous decision?
Bonus Answer: What in the world difference does it make?

June 27, 2009

Thank you, thank you very much, Part III

As I said earlier, the most significant observation made by the [Caperton] majority was to reiterate that State courts are essentially unbound by federal law from devising their own recusal standards.
— Me, 06/10/09
The [Caperton] majority opinion recognized — even urges — States to pass recusal rules that are more rigorous than the due process floor in order to ensure the appearance and reality of impartial judges.
— Thomas Phillips,* 06/11/09
* Former Texas Chief Justice.

June 16, 2009

Weird Caperton commentary continues

For the U.S. Supreme Court decision to have any meaning, there must be disclosure as to the source of the funds.
Unless I'm gravely mistaken, West Virginia has no such disclosure requirements, and the decision had quite a lot of meaning there.

A better question might be: Who are Elliot Associates and Medallion Enterprises, two out-of-State concerns that provided 70 grand for Michael Gableman's campaign during its final three weeks. And what interest might they have in Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions.

June 15, 2009

The Xoff Files

I'm not sure I entirely agree with my friend Bill Christofferson on the anticipated application of Caperton v. Massey here in Wisconsin, but I do think he can claim a measure of vindication after having been termed "almost universally wrong" by a Marquette law professor:
Let's just say that Ziegler, Gableman, and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce are going to be under intense scrutiny, and it is not at all unlikely that one or both of them will sit out some cases WMC put them there to decide.
I can certainly stipulate to that, especially the intense scrutiny part. The majority's decision in Caperton clearly upped the ante on that account, which is exactly what it was formulated to do.

Xoff: Always wrong, but maybe right

June 13, 2009

Thank you, thank you very much

One of MMAC's more compelling arguments is that the skimpy language presented to voters in November in no way described what turned out to be the substance of the ordinance which, MMAC claims, guarantees numerous paid days off not only to victims of sexual abuse and stalking, but also to the stalkers themselves.
— Me, 01/08/09
Indeed, that's exactly why Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Thomas Cooper invalidated the sick leave ordinance, but rejected nearly every other one of MMAC's "less compelling" arguments.

Judge Cooper's Decision and Order is here (.pdf; 38 pgs.). See especially pages seven through 12, wherein the sexual abuse and stalking provisions figure dispositively.

And hey, I'm on a roll:
The factual circumstances specific to Caperton are so over-the-top outrageous, so blatantly corrupt, they're unlikely to be repeated. And it's even unlikelier that anyone will succeed in applying Caperton to a set of facts any less over-the-top outrageous and corrupt.
— Me, 06/10/09
Caperton, in my view, similarly [to NY Times v. Sullivan] involved an outrageous event in that an elected state court judge failed to recuse himself in a case in which a principal recently had spent $3 million to help newly elect the judge.

Chief Justice Roberts is right that the scope of the constitutional standard in Caperton is difficult to discern up front. But that is because the judge’s conduct was so outrageous in failing to recuse himself that most subsequent cases surely will be less compelling.
Prof. Mike McChrystal (expert in legal ethics), 06/11/09.

(I also picked the Penguins to win the Stanley Cup [and Evgeni Malkin to win the Conn Smythe Trophy, although that was a no-brainer].)

*takes bow, purchases lottery ticket*

June 10, 2009

Understatement of the year decade

Justice Michael Gableman has been asked to step aside in a criminal matter because he — and groups supporting him — said he was tough on crime.
— law professor Rick Esenberg
There's just a wee bit more to it than that.

And the hyperbolic coup de grâce:
If that works, there will literally be no one who has ever had a contested race who can sit on a criminal case.
Good grief. As clearly evidenced by his unprecedented ethical imbroglio, nobody has conducted a race like Gableman did.

As a prominent and assiduous Gableman enabler, Rick Esenberg should know that as well as anybody. Literally.

eta: Esenberg claims Paul Soglin (Wisconsin '72) is not a lawyer, although Esenberg is correct in his view that Soglin's reaction to Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. is baselessly "triumphalist."

The factual circumstances specific to Caperton are so over-the-top outrageous, so blatantly corrupt, they're unlikely to be repeated.* And it's even unlikelier that anyone will succeed in applying Caperton to a set of facts any less over-the-top outrageous and corrupt.

Especially important — and something few, if any, commenters have mentioned thus far — are the questionable gyrations in reasoning that Justice Brent Benjamin had to perform in order to reach the result favorable to his benefactor, A.T. Massey CEO Don Blankenship.

But not for those, his disposition may well have survived unscathed.

Caperton is a one-off, much like Bush v. Gore. The Supreme Court couldn't not let the West Virginia situation pass without comment.

The handwringing on both ends of the spectrum is much ado about nothing and as I said earlier, the most significant observation made by the majority was to reiterate that State courts are essentially unbound by federal law from devising their own recusal standards.

* I occasionally allow my idealism to override my cynicism. But it admittedly requires some effort.

June 8, 2009

Will Caperton facilitate Gableman's recusal?

Probably not, as its holding is very narrowly directed at the particular circumstances of the West Virginia case (or so it claims).

On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court this morning in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. reaffirmed the vitality of that doctrinal boogeyman* of local conservatives, "New Federalism":
States may choose to "adopt recusal standards more rigorous than [federal] due process requires." . . .

"The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications. Congress and the States, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated here today."
Furthermore Justice Scalia, in lonely dissent, grumbles that not only did the Court not clarify recusal standards under the Due Process Clause, it only succeeded in muddying them further:
Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, but the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not.**
So both sides might find some goodies in Caperton (.pdf; 40 pgs.).

* Often complained of, but no reason given for the complaints.

** What in the world is the point of remarks like this, one wonders, aside from Scalia burnishing his legend among the faithful devotees.

Among the "criticisms" of Sonia Sotomayor I've encountered is, "Oh, she's not a colorful prose stylist like Scalia." Having read a number of Sotomayor's opinions, I'm here to tell you that an exhaustive and accurate recitation of the facts followed by a plainspoken framing of the legal questions and then a careful, thorough application of the relevant law to those facts is far more valuable than any "colorful" tale of ghouls running around stabbing the Lemon Test with pencils.

eta: Sorry; come to think of it, the Lemon Test was the ghoul and the judges were the ones stabbing it to zombie-death with the pencils.

Whatever.

May 18, 2009

For Gableman, every case is a controversy

Somebody has finally written something of two motions* currently before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, requesting that embattled judge Michael Gableman stand aside from participating in a criminal appeal, the review of which the court accepted last year.

One of the motions is directed toward Gableman himself — which he will almost certainly deny — and the other asks the court to consider Gableman's recusal on due process of law grounds, the factual basis for which constitutional argument is his well documented behavior during an election in which roughly 9.5% of Wisconsin's eligible voters managed to position him on the far right of the high court bench.**

David Ziemer in the Wisconsin Law Journal describes the broad contours of the motions in a report that also features a couple of remarkable observations from some famous local conservative Republicans. First there is this non sequitur issuing from Marquette University law professor Rick Esenberg:
Esenberg said the Massey case and the issues raised by Henak differ, which is why the motion has little chance of success.
In fact "the Massey case" (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc.; see the SCOTUS Wiki) is mentioned only tangentially in one of the motions, which expressly acknowledges that the questions presented by both cases are merely "similar," in that each involves third party contributions to judicial campaigns.

So it's less than clear why Allen's motion has "little chance of success" simply because it's different from Caperton. Not only that, but Caperton hasn't even been decided yet, so nobody knows what — if any — direct application it will have to Gableman's latest imbroglio.

According to Ziemer, Esenberg claims that "virtually all judicial candidates employ a 'tough on crime' philosophy, including Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson during her recent re-election campaign." Prof. Esenberg waxes syllogistic:
"If this motion is granted, then she — and virtually every other candidate who has ever run a contested race — should also be required to recuse themselves as well," Esenberg said.
Emphases added. But this doesn't at all follow either, given the substantial and substantive factual dissimilarities.

Gableman's campaign was devoted almost exclusively to this so-called "tough on crime philosophy" and isn't even remotely comparable to Abrahamson's. Rather, a prominent theme of the Chief Justice's recent campaign was an emphatic disabusing of the notion that judges "side" in advance with either plaintiffs or defendants.

Not only did Gableman continually and demonstrably promise to be an "ally" of law enforcement and its "war on crime," he went well out of his way to denigrate the professional experience of his opponent — so much so that Gableman has found himself up on ethics charges — and even further to disparage the very statutory and constitutional protections to which criminal defendants are entitled.

Abrahamson most certainly engaged in none of that business.

Moreover, the suggested test for Gableman's recusal under the circumstances is not simply whether or not he believes he can perform as an impartial magistrate, but whether a reasonable observer — in this case, the defendant/appellant, Allen — believes Gableman can, based on Gableman's own continuously repeated demonstrations.

This is a point that even the other conservative Republican quoted in Ziemer's story, Wisconsin Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen, appears to have overlooked:
Van Hollen said the motion [sic] "is an attack on our system of electing judges."

Van Hollen added that during an election, judicial candidates are allowed to express their views, within the limits of the law, and Gableman’s actions in 2008 were no different than past years.

"This in no way disqualifies them [justices] from being fair and impartial in a specific case," Van Hollen stated.
The latter is a daringly unequivocal claim. And it can only be true if one accepts that Gableman's actions were "no different than past years." But Gableman's actions were clearly quite different, in that they've succeeded in placing him in the unprecedented situation of being under investigation by the Wisconsin Judicial Commission.

No less an authority than former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Janine Geske had never seen anything like it, describing Gableman's shenanigans as "sinking to new lows," and one may safely accord considerably more deference to her observations than to Van Hollen's.

While it's true that a large amount of financial, media, and other support came from third parties (including, instructively, Rick Esenberg), not only did Gableman do nothing to set himself apart from those attacks against his opponent, but Gableman embraced them enthusiastically by featuring them prominently in his speechifying, his campaign literature, and at his campaign website.

(That website has long since been reduced to a lone index page bearing nothing but a logo, but much of it was previously retrieved and is attached as appendices to the motions for recusal.)

If anything was an attack on Wisconsin's system of electing judges, it was the disgraceful campaign of Gableman and his supporters.

Diane Sykes, the George W. Bush-appointed Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals judge, herself a former Wisconsin Supreme Court justice, called it "utterly inconsistent with the judicial role," and Gableman's notorious teevee ad a "particularly base and deceptive attack."

In any event, Caperton is more similar to Michael Gableman's situation than Esenberg lets on, since it deals with the appearance of bias created by massive campaign contributions to a judicial candidate by third party interests and according to the due process analysis, the appearance of bias is all that's required.

It was a core promise of Gableman's campaign he would not only be biased in favor of law enforcement but biased against criminal defendants. I don't know how even Esenberg could rebut that.

More specifically, one of the notable parallels between Gableman's case and Caperton is the involvement of the business outfit Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, which spent millions of dollars on Gableman's behalf and ran literally thousands of radio and television spots in the weeks before the April, 2008 election disparaging Gableman's opponent for his work decades ago representing criminal defendants.

Rick Esenberg is often presented in the local press as a detached, academic observer, a special favorite of right-wing dissemblers like Charlie Sykes and Patrick McIlheran, and it was in that apparent capacity that he lent himself and Marquette University's prestige to WMC in a video presentation that laid the groundwork for WMC's and ultimately Gableman's notorious attacks on his political opponent.

But Prof. Esenberg's subsequent energetic defenses of the most fanatically and egregiously dishonest of Michael Gableman's supporters did much to detonate that facade of academic disinterest.

* The motions and related documents are available here.

** One of the reasons why Gableman's ethics investigation merits a public hearing — the one his lawyers are seeking to avoid — is so that the remaining 81% can learn more about what antics he got up to.

July 28, 2008

You think Wisconsin is bad

Have a look at West Virginia.

Earlier this month, former federal solicitor general and famed Cheney/Bush 2000 lawyer Theodore B. Olson filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court asking it to hear a case called Caperton v. Massey.

Olson wants the Court to revisit the circumstances of a decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia that his clients contend represents a notably egregious conflict of interest, in that one of the WV justices refused to step away from the case despite having directly benefited from more than $3 million worth of campaign support from one of the parties, A.T. Massey.

The benefit was getting himself elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court and, petitioner Caperton contends, it was directly and brazenly reimbursed several-fold.

That justice, Brent Benjamin, found in favor of Massey to the tune of $50 million — now $76 million with interest — the value of a judgment against Massey in a lower court that Benjamin helped overturn. Benjamin wasn't on the WV Supreme Court at the time of the original judgment; in fact Massey devised its campaign to seat Benjamin in the immediate wake of losing the judgment.

According to the dissenting WV Supreme Court justices, Benjamin basically made up the law as he went along in order to reach the conclusion that best suited his generous benefactor, A.T. Massey.

Apart from that, the SCOTUS petition argues that Benjamin's conflict of interest was so facially blatant it violated the 14th Amendment's Due Process guarantees. Benjamin acted as Chief Justice in the case after the actual C.J. was observed frolicking with A.T. Massey's president and CEO, Don Blankenship, in Monte Carlo.

The case arises from a dispute between two WV coal companies, A.T. Massey and Harman Corp., many of the details of which are reported in the Charleston (WV) Gazette as well as in Olson's petition.

The $3 million-plus was spent waging a political campaign that should sound strikingly familiar to Wisconsinites, and possibly even instructive for future use, especially in view of what SCOTUS may decide to do with the petition (it needn't accept it, but if anybody's going to lend it persuasive heft, it's Theodore Olson).

Rather than extol the virtues of his favored candidate, Don Blankenship set up a § 527 organization called "And For The Sake Of The Kids" which aired teevee ads that attacked Benjamin's opponent, then-incumbent Justice Warren McGraw.

The ads stated, "Letting a child rapist go free? To work in our schools? That's radical Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw. Warren McGraw — too soft on crime. Too dangerous for our kids."

Blankenship also coordinated a letter writing campaign to the State's physicians, ostensibly appealing to their business concerns over medical malpractice insurance premiums, but actually asking them to help "get rid of a judge ... who let a rapist of children out of jail."

Makes you wonder where Mike Gableman and his various enablers and defenders came up with their own election strategery, don't it.

Olson's petition to SCOTUS is available here (.pdf; 38 pgs.).