I read that Judge Barbara Crabb sided with the Freedom From Religion Foundation in ruling that the National Day of Prayer is unconstitutional.No, she ruled explicitly that the federal law creating the National Day of Prayer, and in fact ordering the president to proclaim a National Day of Prayer, is unconstitutional. That distinction is crucial.
Congress established it in 1952 ...And amended it in 1988. In either event, "established" is a decidedly unfortunate choice of words, if your contention is that the law does not violate the First Amendment, which reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
This is a law, that Congress made, respecting an establishment of religion. Note that the First Amendment does not merely forbid an establishment of religion, a popularly held misconception (ironically, often held and espoused by self-described "strict constructionists").
... so they must have thought it was a good idea.Which is hardly relevant, considering Congress must have thought any number of things were good ideas that even conservative activist judges found unconstitutional. That's why there is a Bill of Rights.
It is not forcing us to pray.This was never in question, contra also the editorial page editor of the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel. And insofar as prayer is a matter of personal conscience, you can't "force" other people to do it anyway.
I would like to see her ruling overturned on appeal if one is filed, because it seems to be a frivolous lawsuit in the first place.The fact that the suit was successful in the district court is a reasonably good indication that it was not frivolous, but rather meritorious, the latter being the antonym of frivolous.
I wonder what the next foundation lawsuit will be. How about Christmas? And they should change their name to what their goal really is: "Freedom from God," because God is religion.That settles it then, if God is religion. Because in that case, the law orders the president to proclaim a day when the people of the United States "turn to religion in prayer and meditation at churches."
There is no acknowledgment in the law of synagogues, mosques, adobe huts, nor any other non-Christian buildings, incidentally.
10 comments:
"I read that Judge Barbara Crabb sided with the Freedom From Religion Foundation in ruling that the National Day of Prayer is unconstitutional."
No, she ruled explicitly that the federal law creating the National Day of Prayer, and in fact ordering the president to proclaim a National Day of Prayer, is unconstitutional. That distinction is crucial.
Well, non-specialists writing letters to the editor will sometimes feel the irresistible urge to ratchet up the rhetoric:
I am not going to go ballistic over Judge Barbara Crabb's decision that the National Day of Prayer... violates the Establishment Clause.
Fortunately, public commentators on the law and politics serve the public good by dealing carefully with such matters.
He is not objecting to Judge Crabb's decision so much as the mandatory U.S. Supreme Court authority which directed it. Surely he can't fault her for merely acting as an "umpire" who calls "balls and strikes."
Completely off topic, perhaps you could help and investigate.
What is your opinion regarding this story, as reported by good old Dad29...
legalinsurrection.blogspot.com/2010/04/is-this-way-out-for-states-on-retiree.html
Thanks for the good work, enjoy your stuff!
Thanks. Here is the opinion in .pdf format. So the collective bargaining agreement (the contract) expired, after which the State government adjusted (as in, reduced) the terms of health care benefits to which retiring employees are entitled.
The plaintiff employees (and retired employees) argued that even though the contract had expired, some of its terms extended beyond its expiration, in particular those that would guarantee the higher rate of benefits to those employees covered by the now-expired contract before they were reduced by State law.
Unfortunately the plaintiffs couldn't point to any language in either the expired contract or the law governing public employment to make their case and in fact there was a fair bit of precedent weighing against them.
I'm not familiar enough with the nuances of that area of the law to take issue with the decision, but perhaps these remarks from page 35 of the opinion best describe the situation:
"As active employees represented by Council 94 [the union], these individuals continued to be governed by the give and take of the collective bargaining process. A process which has inherent risks and benefits - the benefits for bargaining unit employees may increase in some respects, or decrease in others."
(Also: must be nice to retire from a government job at 51.)
Same anony from 11:38 p.m.
"Unfortunately the plaintiffs couldn't point to any language in either the expired contract or the law governing public employment to make their case and in fact there was a fair bit of precedent weighing against them."
Are you saying then that the union fouled up because they failed to include language in their contract specifying that, once it expired, the state could NOT be allowed unilaterally to change the contract?
Assume government workers have a contract for 3 years. It ends. There is a negotiation period between the union and government. The state therefore is allowed within that negotiation period to put in place whatever it wants? Then, what's the point of collective bargaining? I thought that the previous terms of the contract would be in place until a settlement was reached...unless there was no language from the past contracts specifying this point.
Am I missing something here?
Thanks.
Same anony--Sorry to bug you, I thought about this again.
So, to my understanding, in this ruling, a government, through the passage of a law, could impose reduced benefits for NEW RETIREES during the "lag" time between an old contract and new contract, i.e. during collective bargaining process.
The union argued that the past terms ought to apply to those deciding to retire now, even during the give and take sessions by workers and government who are hammering out a new deal. I would imagine that if the old contract included specific language agreed to by the workers and government providing those new retirees with the same benefits of past workers during the ongoing negotiations, then the state would be prohibited from passing such a law reducing benefits.
Otherwise, I believe a state cannot unilaterally change the terms of an existing contract between the state workers and government, nor alter the negotiated benefits of state workers who retired under terms of an previous contract.
So it would seem the ruling affects NEW retirees and is a way to possibly circumvent negotiating in good faith.
Does this make sense to you?
Have to get back to you tomorrow.
So, to my understanding, in this ruling, a government, through the passage of a law, could impose reduced benefits for NEW RETIREES during the "lag" time between an old contract and new contract, i.e. during collective bargaining process.
Actually the legislation was passed about a month in advance of the collective bargaining agreement's termination but didn't go into effect until several months later. The new law made adjustments to the ratio of government vs. employee contributions to the retiring employees' health benefits, based on years of service.
The union argued that the past terms ought to apply to those deciding to retire now, even during the give and take sessions by workers and government who are hammering out a new deal.
Very broadly speaking. Some employees argued that they were forced to retire prior to the new law going into effect, in order to preserve the benefits they were guaranteed before then.
I would imagine that if the old contract included specific language agreed to by the workers and government providing those new retirees with the same benefits of past workers during the ongoing negotiations, then the state would be prohibited from passing such a law reducing benefits.
But it didn't contain such language. The plaintiffs argued in the absence of such language there existed that implication. They lost on that argument.
Otherwise, I believe a state cannot unilaterally change the terms of an existing contract between the state workers and government, nor alter the negotiated benefits of state workers who retired under terms of a previous contract.
That I don't know, but that was part of the employees' problem. They made a constitutional argument, that the State was interfering with their rights under the Rhode Island and U.S. Constitutions but the court ruled that neither the collective bargaining agreement nor the State statutes were contracts for those purposes. You'll have to read the opinion for the explanation why.
So it would seem the ruling affects NEW retirees and is a way to possibly circumvent negotiating in good faith.
Not sure what you mean by new retirees. Again, you'll have to read the opinion because the plaintiffs consisted of several groups of employees whose time of retirement was affected by the new law in different ways.
Are you saying then that the union fouled up because they failed to include language in their contract specifying that, once it expired, the state could NOT be allowed unilaterally to change the contract?
I'm not saying that but it's not an unreasonable inference. I expect that both sides could find direction in this opinion as to how to go about renegotiating their collective bargaining agreements in order to avoid -- or, for a State, to ensure -- a similar outcome.
Same anony who posted the questions...Thanks IT!
I appreciate your insight!
concernedcitizen, JSOnline Blog Participant
Aha. Keep givin' 'em hell.
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