Suhr takes another Knapp

Further to my post below, I had occasion to look at the case following immediately on Daniel Suhr's reference to State v. Cleaver.

As discussed previously, in his latest piece of anti-Louis Butler politicking, Suhr wonders whether (1) State v. Knapp has been "used as precedent for further decisions," and whether (2) "other courts [have] accepted or rejected the rationale and rule offered[.]"

He then presents a purported example of the foregoing from Ohio, State v. Farris (.pdf; 20 pgs.).

Of Farris, Suhr writes: "[T]he Ohio Supreme Court cited Knapp and one other state supreme court decision to hold that the Ohio Constitution provided broader pre-Miranda evidence gathering protection than the U.S. Constitution." Emphases added.

The impression Suhr is attempting to convey, clearly, is that the Ohio court relied on Knapp, or used Knapp as authority in support of its disposition. Except it didn't. The Farris court reached its conclusion independently, based on, among other things, previous holdings of the Ohio Supreme Court. But not Knapp.

The sole mention of Knapp in the entire opinion is as an aside. The Farris court simply observes, at the conclusion of its own independent analysis, that its decision happens to put Ohio in accord with Wisconsin on a particular question of law. That's it, that's all. No reliance on Knapp, and no citation to Knapp as authority.

So, as for the Ohio case of State v. Farris, the answer to Suhr's own two questions are (1) No and (2) Neither. To be sure, Knapp was not used as precedent in Farris. And Farris neither accepted nor rejected Knapp's "rationale and rule."

Which raises the question: Why in the world is Suhr using this Ohio case in support of his premise that Knapp has "been relied on by parties in Wisconsin and in other jurisdictions scores of times"?

The answer, obviously, is that Suhr has a preordained political thesis in mind, has set about gathering evidence in support of that thesis, and has few qualms about presenting as "evidence" citations to the law that, on closer inspection, in no way support his conclusion.

Additionally, there is a dissent in Farris. It's worth mentioning that while the dissenters disagree with the majority, their disagreement has nothing to do with Knapp either. Rather, their fundamental objection turns on whether the circumstances of a police confiscation of a bag of marijuana following a traffic stop should be evaluated according to the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause or the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause. The dissenters don't mention Knapp at all.

Nor has Suhr any legitimate business mentioning Farris for the purpose of maligning Justice Butler. Bad form, Daniel.